Hello. I would like to request a peer review of this essay, with emphasis placed on areas of weakness, points of strength, and suggestions on improvement. This is the first time posting onto this forum, and as such I do apologize for any infractions concerning decorum. [Note that this was originally posted in the wrong category, and has now be rectified]
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The Russo-Ukrainian War: A History and Proposal for a Lasting Peace
For the average person in the Western sphere, particularly those from the United States, the word "Ukraine" was likely never known prior to 2022, nor could this average person pin the country on a map. A more attentive and well-read person may have generally followed the course of events following that country's revolution in 2014 and the ongoing insurgency independently, however- save for the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight 17 in that year -the news cycle would not dwell on the conflict in that part of the world for long. This naturally would change following the 2022 Russian invasion of that country, and Ukraine would take on a larger presence in the regular news cycle as all of the mainstream media put out a steady stream of material concerning the conflict- often with a Ukrainian slant instead of true neutrality -as it proceeded. Now, as the conflict is in the midst of its third year and presently to the advantage of Russia, attempts to bring the conflict to an end have been discussed- particularly encouraged by United States President Donald Trump. However, in order to ensure a lasting, permanent peace is established between the two nations, the origins and primary causes of this conflict must be fully understood as to make sure a new, potentially far more destructive conflict is not necessary- and this paper will seek to offer potential solutions to this.
It is naturally important to preface this proposal with a brief history of the region, properly starting with Ukrainian Independence on the 1st of December 1991, weeks before the signing of the Belovezha Accords and the official dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the country's independence referendum, and what is relevant to this history is that 55% of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine had voted in favor of independence, and "..Even in the country's heavily russified East, more than 80 percent favored independence, as did a majority in the Crimea, which had been Russian territory until 1954." (Treisman). However, conflict would soon come forth between the ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian populations, most prominently starting with a language referendum in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. The two being majority-Russian provinces of Ukraine, they had in 1994 held a referendum on establishing the Russian language as an official regional language alongside Ukrainian, and this had ended in 90% of voters being in favor of this- however, the Ukrainian government would later annul the vote (Research Directorate). Tensions would grow and fester between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians over the years as the newly-independent Ukrainian government gradually got its own footing following legislative elections that same year, and as these events took place, the stage for what was to come was being set on a more geopolitical scale- and this will be touched on at a later point.
To return to the central topic, tensions would rise ever more as Ukrainian politics gradually became more divided between pro-EU and pro-Russia camps, eventually reaching a boiling point following then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign on to an association agreement and trade deal with the European Union in 2013- despite three months prior being set on signing the association agreement, hinting at pressure put on Yanukovych to refuse the agreement (Piper). Protests soon broke out in Kiev that year, which would go on to spiral into a full revolution- what would become known later on as Euromaidan -the next year and would see Yanukovych ousted from office by Ukraine's parliament. Of note during this period of 2013 to 2014 is the emergence of the neo-fascist Right Sector, as the group took a leading role in the violent clashes with police throughout Euromaidan, and according to BBC News had stated early in 2014 that, "..[They] had 500 fighters on Independence Square and could mobilise up to 5,000 nationwide, although close observers of the protests doubt this." (BBC News). Additionally, following the ousting of Yanukovych, both Donetsk and Luhansk would declare independence from Ukraine- utilizing old communist imagery as a symbol of old unity between Russians and Ukrainians -and gave the Ukrainian government an ultimatum to release pro-Moscow separatist prisoners, enshrine Russian as an official regional language, and allow a referendum on the future of the region, or face an insurgency. Alongside this and allegedly on the invitation of the ousted Yanukovych, Russian forces would move in to occupy Crimea and later annex it into the Russian Federation.
Concurrent to these developments in the Ukrainian government, a sensitive phone call between then-Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland and then-US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt would be leaked online that would show the US' hand in what was becoming yet another chess game between Washington and Moscow (Mardell). In that phone call between Nuland and Pyatt, the general topic was on choosing the structuring of the Ukrainian government- as opposed to allowing the Ukrainian people to do such -and mention plans to nudge the outcome into one palatable to Washington. Part of this is getting the Ukrainian opposition leaders pliable, Pyatt saying for instance, "But I think your argument to [Vitaly Klitschko], which you'll need to make, I think that's the next phone call you want to set up, is exactly the one you made to Yats [Arseniy Yatseniuk]. And I'm glad you sort of put him on the spot on where he fits in this scenario. And I'm very glad that he said what he said in response.", with Nuland replying, "Good. I don't think [Klitschko] should go into the government. I don't think it's necessary, I don't think it's a good idea." (BBC News). Vitaly Klitschko and Arseniy Yatseniuk were both main opposition leaders in Ukraine's parliament- Klitschko a candidate for the 2014 Ukrainian presidential elections before dropping out, and Yatseniuk would be the Prime Minister briefly in the government formed immediately after the 2014 revolution, and later serve a second term from 2014 to 2016. The conversation between Nuland and Pryatt continues, discussing the greater attempt to marshal the Ukrainian opposition, keeping the moderate democrats together, and the UN's role in fostering a deal to resolve the political crisis, leading into Nuland's infamous "F--- the EU" comment- resulting from EU concerns the US is getting too involved in the matter.
The following years of insurgency in the Donbas region would see the aforementioned neo-fascist groups like Right Sector and Azov Battalion take active part in fighting for the Ukrainian government against Donetsk and Luhansk, the leader of Right Sector encouraging his followers to take up arms following the separatists seizing of public buildings in Sloviansk (BBC News). As the conflict would continue on, there would be two attempts made by Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine to broker a ceasefire between the Donbas separatists and the Ukrainian government- the two Minsk Agreements, the first signed in 2015 and the second in 2016. Ultimately, both would fail in maintaining a ceasefire between the two forces, and fighting would continue from 2016 up to 2022. Notably, in an interview with the German magazine Die Zeit, former German chancellor Angela Merkel would briefly discuss Minsk I and II as it pertained to the war between Russia and Ukraine, saying that, "Neither of these countries met the necessary prerequisites [to join NATO], nor had the consequences of such a decision been fully considered, both with regard to Russia's actions against Georgia and Ukraine and to NATO and its mutual assistance rules. And the 2014 Minsk Agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as we can see today." (Die Zeit). Suffice to say that this comment was interpreted by Russia to mean that France and Germany had no intention of adhering to the Minsk Agreements, with Russian President Vladimir Putin saying of this, "After a statement like that, the question arises of how to negotiate, about what, and is it possible to negotiate with someone, and where are the guarantees. An agreement will have to be reached in the end, all the same. I have said many times that we are ready for these agreements, we are open, but this makes us think who we are dealing with." (Reuters).
Before going further, it is important to note the ongoing geopolitics happening alongside these events in Ukraine. Since the 2008 Bucharest Summit, where NATO promised membership to both Ukraine and Georgia, specifically stating in the Summit Declaration that, "NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO." (NATO). Between 2014 and 2022, the post-Maiden Ukrainian government would make joining NATO a priority, and in 2016 NATO would agree to consolidate its aid to Ukraine into a 'Comprehensive Assistance Package', with the intention of supporting Ukrainian national security alongside reforming the country to NATO's standard in preparation to join the alliance. NATO expansion to the extent of both Ukraine and Georgia was naturally something Moscow would not allow, and the Russo-Georgian War became a clear example that Russia was now past the point of issuing protest. However, to fully understand the reasons for Moscow's staunch opposition to not just this move but NATO expansion in general, the rather troubled history of Russia and NATO needs to be understood.
The first thing that must be mentioned in regards to Russian concern over the expansion of NATO is the topography of Russia. The more-developed European Russia is situated on the European Plain with nothing in the way of natural barriers, and therefore nothing to hinder an invader's march into the heart of the country. The Russians had already been subject to two major western invasions- by Napoleon's Grande Armée in 1812 and by Hitler's German Reich in 1941 -and it was the latter of these invasions that partly played a role in the Soviet satellite states established post-war and the formation of the Eastern Bloc, in order to create a buffer between themselves and any potential western invader; it is apt to say that World War II was a "formative scar" on the Soviet Union and later post-communist Russia. In 1990, in the twilight weeks of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev- the last leader of the Soviet Union -was given multiple assurances by then-US Secretary of State James Baker in a meeting on January 9th that a reunified Germany in NATO would not mean further expansion eastward, saying, "We understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction. We believe that consultations and discussions within the framework of the "two + four" mechanism should guarantee that Germany's unification will not lead to NATO's military organization spreading to the east." (National Security Archive). Baker then asks Gorbachev his opinion on if he prefers a reunified Germany absolutely neutral or with connections to NATO but with a guarantee there will be no further movement east, to which Gorbachev responds, "We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable." (National Security Archive), to which Baker agrees. While not necessarily a binding agreement, Gorbachev took the assurances of Baker- among others -as valid assurances the US had no plans to expand NATO and there would be a non-aligned buffer between NATO and Russia, and this was something future Russian leaders would interpret as a valid agreement.
However, the new Clinton administration would decide to go in a different direction, pushing to enlarge NATO in the run-up to the 1994 Summit in Brussels and US Congressional Elections. This move would not go without challenge, as an open letter addressed to former President Bill Clinton- with prominent signatories such as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, leading member of the Committee on Present Danger Paul Nitze, former CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner, and former National Security Council member Marshal Shulman, among others -would implore him against the decision to expand NATO. They argued the move would have severe consequences with Russia, Europe, in NATO itself, and within the United States, and warned that it would be, "a policy error of historic importance" (McCgwire and Clarke). In addition to concerns of Americans, at lot of whom had no love for the former Soviet Union, the British were also staunchly opposed to the idea in the early 1990s, though they would ultimately shift opinion at the 1994 NATO Summit- be this a result of new benefits discovered or a need to adhere to the reality of living in a Pax Americana. The Clinton Administration would not heed the warning of the letter, and would later push for the admission of much of the former Eastern Bloc into NATO, inviting Poland, Czechia, and Hungary to join in April of 1999 and emphasizing an open-door policy for admission of the Baltic States- who would join the alliance alongside Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004. By 2008, membership would be offered to Ukraine and Georgia, and as has been said earlier, this was the point that the Russians had put the proverbial foot down on the expansion of NATO, inciting a war with Georgia in order to prevent their joining. To quote the former Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates in an interview on July 23-24 of 2000, "...at a time of a special humiliation and difficulty for Russia, pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward, when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn't happen, at least in no time soon, I think probably has not only aggravated the relationship between the United States and Russia but made it much more difficult to do constructive business with them. I think between that and the bombing of Belgrade we have really antagonized the Russians in a major way and I think those are two things that the Bush administration would not have done, when all is said and done." (Miller Center).
As the initial conflict between government forces and separatists continued in Donetsk and Luhansk, the pseudo-direct involvement of Moscow would gradually become apparent. In as early as 2014, it was noted by former-Secretary General and former Danish PM Anders Fogh Rasmussen that a Russian incursion had occurred the previous night- refraining from calling it an invasion. He went on to say, "It just confirms the fact that we see a continuous flow of weapons and fighters from Russia into eastern Ukraine and it is a clear demonstration of continued Russian involvement in the destabilization of eastern Ukraine," (CNBC), and this serves to highlight not only how early Russian involvement in the Donbas War started, but also the extent of the war materiel they had been delivering to the separatist forces. The presence of Russian military personnel in Ukraine would be met with blanket denials until 2015 when, in a Moscow conference centre, Vladimir Putin would confirm the presence of Russian special forces within Ukraine, however noting that none were regular soldiers, "We never said there were no people there who were carrying out certain tasks including in the military sphere. But that does not mean there are Russian (regular) troops there, feel the difference." (Osborn). To further add to this on the presence of Russian military personnel, a report from the International Crisis Group on January 5th of 2016 that the militias of Donetsk and Luhansk had, by 2015, been reorganized from a poorly-led and poorly-disciplined group into one that fit a formal military structure by Russian military officers, and these officers were now in command of the separatist forces, the former commanders occasionally made deputies to their Russian counterparts (ICG). This more low-level type of involvement would persist right up until 2022, when Russia would invade Ukraine under the stated goal of disarming and denazifying the country.
With the history of this conflict covered, it is now time to address the status of the ongoing war as it is in the middle of its third year. At present, the war is proceeding to the advantage of Russia, which- as has been mentioned before -is making gradual gains across the frontline. Ukraine is suffering from a desertion crisis- likely not aided by the failures of both their relatively brief Kursk incursion and the 2023 Spring-Summer Offensive -and it is estimated that, despite more aggressive mobilization efforts such as "busification", there could have been as many as two-hundred thousand deserters as of 2024, with only one-hundred thousand soldiers confirmed to have deserted and been charged under Ukrainian desertion laws since 2022 (Kullab and Yurchuck). While this is not a Ukraine-exclusive problem, as Russian forces have had to deal with desertions as well, one can only imagine the effects the aforementioned operational failures have had on the Ukrainians. Related to this, a saying can't help but come to mind: that, the more one hypes up a given military operation as an assured success, the more crushing to morale it will be when that operation fails utterly- it's certainly a lesson French General Robert Nivelle learned in 1917, and many more before and after him.
In addition to desertion, there is the matter of non-fatal casualties the Ukrainian Army has suffered over the course of the war. As far back as 2023, there was an estimated number of around twenty-thousand to fifty-thousand amputees, a number that rivals the total number of amputees per country suffered in the Great War- surpassing the number of British amputees while falling short of the German number (Pancevski). As these were the number of amputees Ukraine suffered from 2022 to 2023- and while it can be assumed the Russians have suffered a similar number, though perhaps not exactly given they had largely stayed on the defense during the Ukrainian Offensive -one can only imagine what the number is now two years later. With this information in mind, it is no surprise that war support among Ukrainian civilians has fallen considerably, as more than half of the civilian population- 52% -would prefer a negotiated peace as opposed to fighting until Ukraine wins the war- only 38% believing the latter- and among that 52%, the majority- another 52% -would accept territorial concessions. Along with this, general war support in 2024 had fallen below 50% country-wide, regardless of how close the region is to the front- previously, the least amount of support in 2022 was restricted to the southern and eastern parts of the country (Vigers).
Additionally, there has been ongoing talk from British PM Keir Starmer and French President Emanuel Macron of forming a "Coalition of the Willing" out of NATO member states, with the stated goal to deter future Russian action with a direct presence inside the country, though there are fears such a move could destabilize the situation- with a worst-case scenario being that this move dominoes into an eventual Third World War, or even a thermonuclear war. Perhaps a more extreme hypothesis on how such a move from the Western European nations may proceed, it is arguable to say that such a fear does perhaps exist of an uncontrollable spiral towards oblivion- though perhaps one that may not come to fruition. While the intended goal of this coalition is a troop strength of sixty-four thousand, the reality of the situation is that they are presently struggling to reach a troop strength of even twenty-five thousand- with contributions almost exclusively being sourced from the French and British armies. A combination of manpower and war materiel shortages has led to a rethinking of how this force would look, with the likely answer being that French and British military advisors would instead be sent into the country as opposed to a multinational military force (Brown).
Worth noting is that, on June 1st of this year- as peace proposals between Russia and Ukraine are discussed as a part of US President Donald Trump's larger effort to end the war -the Russian delegation had submitted a peace proposal to their Ukrainian counterparts, and this was later published online the day after. The proposal describes three main points, concerning parameters to a definitive settlement, ceasefire conditions with two options, and a proposed implementation timeline- and this names key demands, such as a ban on Ukraine joining a military alliance or hosting foreign military personnel in the country, Russian gaining the status of an official language, and the legal recognition of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Crimea, and Zaporizhzhia as apart of the Russian Federation. It is presently unclear whether or not the Ukrainian government will accept a peace along these terms, with the way the war is presently proceeding it is unlikely that they will be able to have much negotiation sway. It is personally hoped that the Ukrainian government does choose peace in the end as opposed to following the lead of Germany in 1945 and the Reich's obsession with a "final victory" against the United Nations- the Allied Powers -as their cities were bombed and burned and their civilians suffered throughout.
Finally, there is the crux of this paper: namely, a hypothetical proposal on ending the Russo-Ukrainian War in a fashion that will prevent the need for a new war. Though it perhaps isn't the most appropriate example for this, the reason for the rather extreme terms the British had demanded of the Qing Dynasty during the First Opium War was to ensure all matters were settled and that another expensive war would not be necessary. The only thing peace based on compromise achieves is making both parties disgruntled and eager for the next confrontation, and it was the unsettled terms regarding opium legalization in both the Treaty of Nanking and the supplementary Treaty of the Bogue that played a part in paving the way for the Second Opium War. It is immensely important that the peace is designed to be a lasting one, otherwise the only thing it will achieve is putting the bloodshed on pause for maybe ten or twenty years. Therefore, the hypothetical peace proposals discussed- to be framed as alternatives to the actual peace proposals -will not be compromise peace proposals, and while these hypotheticals will ultimately be towards Russia's benefit, this does not mean that they will be entirely to Ukraine's detriment, as Russian success in the field does not yet translate into the vehicle for a punitive peace. There will be certain items Ukraine will be forced to accept and other items that could perhaps become more lenient- furthermore, both the following proposals will be sure to address both Russian national security concerns, as well as Ukraine's needs as a sovereign state.
The first hypothetical will be formed along similar lines to the Russian delegation's peace proposal, including Ukrainian legal recognition of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Crimea, and Zaporizhzhia as part of Russia, Ukrainian permanent neutrality and abstention from joining any military alliance, disbanding of ultranationalist and neo-fascist organizations and political parties, and the enshrined status of the Russian language in Ukraine and fair treatment for the ethnic Russian population. Essentially, the the terms described in the Russian delegation's proposal would remain the same, however with the alteration of provision five, specifically on the maximum size of the AFU, could perhaps be modified to lean more towards a de-escalation of military activity in certain parts of the country- Kiev and Chernigov in particular -along with the addition of allowing Ukraine to join the European Union under a purely economic context, as to not interfere with the provision on Ukrainian neutrality. The second hypothetical proposal, likewise to the first, will base itself off the Russian delegation's proposal, however this proposal will more so concern itself with the Donbas peoples' right to self-determination. This will be achieved through the previously named regions of Ukraine officially annexed into the Russian Federation gaining an official status as something analogous to United Nations Trust Territories- to be either under Russian administration or the administration of a third party. They will persist under this official status for a period of ten years before a referendum is to be held on the future of the regions, either to officially join Russia or to remain with Ukraine. In addition, a demilitarized zone will be established on the border of Russia and Ukraine- drawn in a fashion that will avoid dividing villages in two -that will be managed by the United Nations as a peacekeeping mission under the nationality of a third party country in order to prevent the scenario of a potential flare-up and hostilities resuming- suggestions for this "third party country" include Switzerland, Austria, and Turkey.
In conclusion, while both of these hypothetical proposals will, in all due likelihood, not be what the real peace terms will look like whenever negotiations officially begin, it is said in general confidence that the hypotheticals presented decently accomplish the stated goal of crafting a peace that addresses the main causes of the war in order prevent the need for another war. It additionally avoids the pitfalls inherent in compromise peace while addressing both the concerns of Russia and the sovereignty of Ukraine, which should be an important consideration in the real peace treaty as to avert a revanchist sentiment being able to take root and fester. Both the Treaty of Frankfurt and Treaty of Versailles and their subsequent effect on relations between France and Germany from 1871 to 1939 all but prove that revanchism all but guarantees a new war will occur at some point in the future- be that by a difference of forty years or a difference of twenty. While the falling morale among Ukrainian civilians across the whole country and the growing desire to negotiate an end the war may dampen the effects of revanchist sentiment, that does not mean that it would make it impossible for revanchism to drag the country into a far more destructive war however many decades down the line- perhaps in a similar to France and the "Black Stain" of losing Alsace-Lorraine, or to Germany and her territorial losses as a result of Versailles.
Works Cited
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The Russo-Ukrainian War: A History and Proposal for a Lasting Peace
For the average person in the Western sphere, particularly those from the United States, the word "Ukraine" was likely never known prior to 2022, nor could this average person pin the country on a map. A more attentive and well-read person may have generally followed the course of events following that country's revolution in 2014 and the ongoing insurgency independently, however- save for the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight 17 in that year -the news cycle would not dwell on the conflict in that part of the world for long. This naturally would change following the 2022 Russian invasion of that country, and Ukraine would take on a larger presence in the regular news cycle as all of the mainstream media put out a steady stream of material concerning the conflict- often with a Ukrainian slant instead of true neutrality -as it proceeded. Now, as the conflict is in the midst of its third year and presently to the advantage of Russia, attempts to bring the conflict to an end have been discussed- particularly encouraged by United States President Donald Trump. However, in order to ensure a lasting, permanent peace is established between the two nations, the origins and primary causes of this conflict must be fully understood as to make sure a new, potentially far more destructive conflict is not necessary- and this paper will seek to offer potential solutions to this.
It is naturally important to preface this proposal with a brief history of the region, properly starting with Ukrainian Independence on the 1st of December 1991, weeks before the signing of the Belovezha Accords and the official dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the country's independence referendum, and what is relevant to this history is that 55% of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine had voted in favor of independence, and "..Even in the country's heavily russified East, more than 80 percent favored independence, as did a majority in the Crimea, which had been Russian territory until 1954." (Treisman). However, conflict would soon come forth between the ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian populations, most prominently starting with a language referendum in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. The two being majority-Russian provinces of Ukraine, they had in 1994 held a referendum on establishing the Russian language as an official regional language alongside Ukrainian, and this had ended in 90% of voters being in favor of this- however, the Ukrainian government would later annul the vote (Research Directorate). Tensions would grow and fester between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians over the years as the newly-independent Ukrainian government gradually got its own footing following legislative elections that same year, and as these events took place, the stage for what was to come was being set on a more geopolitical scale- and this will be touched on at a later point.
To return to the central topic, tensions would rise ever more as Ukrainian politics gradually became more divided between pro-EU and pro-Russia camps, eventually reaching a boiling point following then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign on to an association agreement and trade deal with the European Union in 2013- despite three months prior being set on signing the association agreement, hinting at pressure put on Yanukovych to refuse the agreement (Piper). Protests soon broke out in Kiev that year, which would go on to spiral into a full revolution- what would become known later on as Euromaidan -the next year and would see Yanukovych ousted from office by Ukraine's parliament. Of note during this period of 2013 to 2014 is the emergence of the neo-fascist Right Sector, as the group took a leading role in the violent clashes with police throughout Euromaidan, and according to BBC News had stated early in 2014 that, "..[They] had 500 fighters on Independence Square and could mobilise up to 5,000 nationwide, although close observers of the protests doubt this." (BBC News). Additionally, following the ousting of Yanukovych, both Donetsk and Luhansk would declare independence from Ukraine- utilizing old communist imagery as a symbol of old unity between Russians and Ukrainians -and gave the Ukrainian government an ultimatum to release pro-Moscow separatist prisoners, enshrine Russian as an official regional language, and allow a referendum on the future of the region, or face an insurgency. Alongside this and allegedly on the invitation of the ousted Yanukovych, Russian forces would move in to occupy Crimea and later annex it into the Russian Federation.
Concurrent to these developments in the Ukrainian government, a sensitive phone call between then-Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland and then-US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt would be leaked online that would show the US' hand in what was becoming yet another chess game between Washington and Moscow (Mardell). In that phone call between Nuland and Pyatt, the general topic was on choosing the structuring of the Ukrainian government- as opposed to allowing the Ukrainian people to do such -and mention plans to nudge the outcome into one palatable to Washington. Part of this is getting the Ukrainian opposition leaders pliable, Pyatt saying for instance, "But I think your argument to [Vitaly Klitschko], which you'll need to make, I think that's the next phone call you want to set up, is exactly the one you made to Yats [Arseniy Yatseniuk]. And I'm glad you sort of put him on the spot on where he fits in this scenario. And I'm very glad that he said what he said in response.", with Nuland replying, "Good. I don't think [Klitschko] should go into the government. I don't think it's necessary, I don't think it's a good idea." (BBC News). Vitaly Klitschko and Arseniy Yatseniuk were both main opposition leaders in Ukraine's parliament- Klitschko a candidate for the 2014 Ukrainian presidential elections before dropping out, and Yatseniuk would be the Prime Minister briefly in the government formed immediately after the 2014 revolution, and later serve a second term from 2014 to 2016. The conversation between Nuland and Pryatt continues, discussing the greater attempt to marshal the Ukrainian opposition, keeping the moderate democrats together, and the UN's role in fostering a deal to resolve the political crisis, leading into Nuland's infamous "F--- the EU" comment- resulting from EU concerns the US is getting too involved in the matter.
The following years of insurgency in the Donbas region would see the aforementioned neo-fascist groups like Right Sector and Azov Battalion take active part in fighting for the Ukrainian government against Donetsk and Luhansk, the leader of Right Sector encouraging his followers to take up arms following the separatists seizing of public buildings in Sloviansk (BBC News). As the conflict would continue on, there would be two attempts made by Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine to broker a ceasefire between the Donbas separatists and the Ukrainian government- the two Minsk Agreements, the first signed in 2015 and the second in 2016. Ultimately, both would fail in maintaining a ceasefire between the two forces, and fighting would continue from 2016 up to 2022. Notably, in an interview with the German magazine Die Zeit, former German chancellor Angela Merkel would briefly discuss Minsk I and II as it pertained to the war between Russia and Ukraine, saying that, "Neither of these countries met the necessary prerequisites [to join NATO], nor had the consequences of such a decision been fully considered, both with regard to Russia's actions against Georgia and Ukraine and to NATO and its mutual assistance rules. And the 2014 Minsk Agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as we can see today." (Die Zeit). Suffice to say that this comment was interpreted by Russia to mean that France and Germany had no intention of adhering to the Minsk Agreements, with Russian President Vladimir Putin saying of this, "After a statement like that, the question arises of how to negotiate, about what, and is it possible to negotiate with someone, and where are the guarantees. An agreement will have to be reached in the end, all the same. I have said many times that we are ready for these agreements, we are open, but this makes us think who we are dealing with." (Reuters).
Before going further, it is important to note the ongoing geopolitics happening alongside these events in Ukraine. Since the 2008 Bucharest Summit, where NATO promised membership to both Ukraine and Georgia, specifically stating in the Summit Declaration that, "NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO." (NATO). Between 2014 and 2022, the post-Maiden Ukrainian government would make joining NATO a priority, and in 2016 NATO would agree to consolidate its aid to Ukraine into a 'Comprehensive Assistance Package', with the intention of supporting Ukrainian national security alongside reforming the country to NATO's standard in preparation to join the alliance. NATO expansion to the extent of both Ukraine and Georgia was naturally something Moscow would not allow, and the Russo-Georgian War became a clear example that Russia was now past the point of issuing protest. However, to fully understand the reasons for Moscow's staunch opposition to not just this move but NATO expansion in general, the rather troubled history of Russia and NATO needs to be understood.
The first thing that must be mentioned in regards to Russian concern over the expansion of NATO is the topography of Russia. The more-developed European Russia is situated on the European Plain with nothing in the way of natural barriers, and therefore nothing to hinder an invader's march into the heart of the country. The Russians had already been subject to two major western invasions- by Napoleon's Grande Armée in 1812 and by Hitler's German Reich in 1941 -and it was the latter of these invasions that partly played a role in the Soviet satellite states established post-war and the formation of the Eastern Bloc, in order to create a buffer between themselves and any potential western invader; it is apt to say that World War II was a "formative scar" on the Soviet Union and later post-communist Russia. In 1990, in the twilight weeks of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev- the last leader of the Soviet Union -was given multiple assurances by then-US Secretary of State James Baker in a meeting on January 9th that a reunified Germany in NATO would not mean further expansion eastward, saying, "We understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction. We believe that consultations and discussions within the framework of the "two + four" mechanism should guarantee that Germany's unification will not lead to NATO's military organization spreading to the east." (National Security Archive). Baker then asks Gorbachev his opinion on if he prefers a reunified Germany absolutely neutral or with connections to NATO but with a guarantee there will be no further movement east, to which Gorbachev responds, "We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable." (National Security Archive), to which Baker agrees. While not necessarily a binding agreement, Gorbachev took the assurances of Baker- among others -as valid assurances the US had no plans to expand NATO and there would be a non-aligned buffer between NATO and Russia, and this was something future Russian leaders would interpret as a valid agreement.
However, the new Clinton administration would decide to go in a different direction, pushing to enlarge NATO in the run-up to the 1994 Summit in Brussels and US Congressional Elections. This move would not go without challenge, as an open letter addressed to former President Bill Clinton- with prominent signatories such as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, leading member of the Committee on Present Danger Paul Nitze, former CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner, and former National Security Council member Marshal Shulman, among others -would implore him against the decision to expand NATO. They argued the move would have severe consequences with Russia, Europe, in NATO itself, and within the United States, and warned that it would be, "a policy error of historic importance" (McCgwire and Clarke). In addition to concerns of Americans, at lot of whom had no love for the former Soviet Union, the British were also staunchly opposed to the idea in the early 1990s, though they would ultimately shift opinion at the 1994 NATO Summit- be this a result of new benefits discovered or a need to adhere to the reality of living in a Pax Americana. The Clinton Administration would not heed the warning of the letter, and would later push for the admission of much of the former Eastern Bloc into NATO, inviting Poland, Czechia, and Hungary to join in April of 1999 and emphasizing an open-door policy for admission of the Baltic States- who would join the alliance alongside Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004. By 2008, membership would be offered to Ukraine and Georgia, and as has been said earlier, this was the point that the Russians had put the proverbial foot down on the expansion of NATO, inciting a war with Georgia in order to prevent their joining. To quote the former Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates in an interview on July 23-24 of 2000, "...at a time of a special humiliation and difficulty for Russia, pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward, when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn't happen, at least in no time soon, I think probably has not only aggravated the relationship between the United States and Russia but made it much more difficult to do constructive business with them. I think between that and the bombing of Belgrade we have really antagonized the Russians in a major way and I think those are two things that the Bush administration would not have done, when all is said and done." (Miller Center).
As the initial conflict between government forces and separatists continued in Donetsk and Luhansk, the pseudo-direct involvement of Moscow would gradually become apparent. In as early as 2014, it was noted by former-Secretary General and former Danish PM Anders Fogh Rasmussen that a Russian incursion had occurred the previous night- refraining from calling it an invasion. He went on to say, "It just confirms the fact that we see a continuous flow of weapons and fighters from Russia into eastern Ukraine and it is a clear demonstration of continued Russian involvement in the destabilization of eastern Ukraine," (CNBC), and this serves to highlight not only how early Russian involvement in the Donbas War started, but also the extent of the war materiel they had been delivering to the separatist forces. The presence of Russian military personnel in Ukraine would be met with blanket denials until 2015 when, in a Moscow conference centre, Vladimir Putin would confirm the presence of Russian special forces within Ukraine, however noting that none were regular soldiers, "We never said there were no people there who were carrying out certain tasks including in the military sphere. But that does not mean there are Russian (regular) troops there, feel the difference." (Osborn). To further add to this on the presence of Russian military personnel, a report from the International Crisis Group on January 5th of 2016 that the militias of Donetsk and Luhansk had, by 2015, been reorganized from a poorly-led and poorly-disciplined group into one that fit a formal military structure by Russian military officers, and these officers were now in command of the separatist forces, the former commanders occasionally made deputies to their Russian counterparts (ICG). This more low-level type of involvement would persist right up until 2022, when Russia would invade Ukraine under the stated goal of disarming and denazifying the country.
With the history of this conflict covered, it is now time to address the status of the ongoing war as it is in the middle of its third year. At present, the war is proceeding to the advantage of Russia, which- as has been mentioned before -is making gradual gains across the frontline. Ukraine is suffering from a desertion crisis- likely not aided by the failures of both their relatively brief Kursk incursion and the 2023 Spring-Summer Offensive -and it is estimated that, despite more aggressive mobilization efforts such as "busification", there could have been as many as two-hundred thousand deserters as of 2024, with only one-hundred thousand soldiers confirmed to have deserted and been charged under Ukrainian desertion laws since 2022 (Kullab and Yurchuck). While this is not a Ukraine-exclusive problem, as Russian forces have had to deal with desertions as well, one can only imagine the effects the aforementioned operational failures have had on the Ukrainians. Related to this, a saying can't help but come to mind: that, the more one hypes up a given military operation as an assured success, the more crushing to morale it will be when that operation fails utterly- it's certainly a lesson French General Robert Nivelle learned in 1917, and many more before and after him.
In addition to desertion, there is the matter of non-fatal casualties the Ukrainian Army has suffered over the course of the war. As far back as 2023, there was an estimated number of around twenty-thousand to fifty-thousand amputees, a number that rivals the total number of amputees per country suffered in the Great War- surpassing the number of British amputees while falling short of the German number (Pancevski). As these were the number of amputees Ukraine suffered from 2022 to 2023- and while it can be assumed the Russians have suffered a similar number, though perhaps not exactly given they had largely stayed on the defense during the Ukrainian Offensive -one can only imagine what the number is now two years later. With this information in mind, it is no surprise that war support among Ukrainian civilians has fallen considerably, as more than half of the civilian population- 52% -would prefer a negotiated peace as opposed to fighting until Ukraine wins the war- only 38% believing the latter- and among that 52%, the majority- another 52% -would accept territorial concessions. Along with this, general war support in 2024 had fallen below 50% country-wide, regardless of how close the region is to the front- previously, the least amount of support in 2022 was restricted to the southern and eastern parts of the country (Vigers).
Additionally, there has been ongoing talk from British PM Keir Starmer and French President Emanuel Macron of forming a "Coalition of the Willing" out of NATO member states, with the stated goal to deter future Russian action with a direct presence inside the country, though there are fears such a move could destabilize the situation- with a worst-case scenario being that this move dominoes into an eventual Third World War, or even a thermonuclear war. Perhaps a more extreme hypothesis on how such a move from the Western European nations may proceed, it is arguable to say that such a fear does perhaps exist of an uncontrollable spiral towards oblivion- though perhaps one that may not come to fruition. While the intended goal of this coalition is a troop strength of sixty-four thousand, the reality of the situation is that they are presently struggling to reach a troop strength of even twenty-five thousand- with contributions almost exclusively being sourced from the French and British armies. A combination of manpower and war materiel shortages has led to a rethinking of how this force would look, with the likely answer being that French and British military advisors would instead be sent into the country as opposed to a multinational military force (Brown).
Worth noting is that, on June 1st of this year- as peace proposals between Russia and Ukraine are discussed as a part of US President Donald Trump's larger effort to end the war -the Russian delegation had submitted a peace proposal to their Ukrainian counterparts, and this was later published online the day after. The proposal describes three main points, concerning parameters to a definitive settlement, ceasefire conditions with two options, and a proposed implementation timeline- and this names key demands, such as a ban on Ukraine joining a military alliance or hosting foreign military personnel in the country, Russian gaining the status of an official language, and the legal recognition of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Crimea, and Zaporizhzhia as apart of the Russian Federation. It is presently unclear whether or not the Ukrainian government will accept a peace along these terms, with the way the war is presently proceeding it is unlikely that they will be able to have much negotiation sway. It is personally hoped that the Ukrainian government does choose peace in the end as opposed to following the lead of Germany in 1945 and the Reich's obsession with a "final victory" against the United Nations- the Allied Powers -as their cities were bombed and burned and their civilians suffered throughout.
Finally, there is the crux of this paper: namely, a hypothetical proposal on ending the Russo-Ukrainian War in a fashion that will prevent the need for a new war. Though it perhaps isn't the most appropriate example for this, the reason for the rather extreme terms the British had demanded of the Qing Dynasty during the First Opium War was to ensure all matters were settled and that another expensive war would not be necessary. The only thing peace based on compromise achieves is making both parties disgruntled and eager for the next confrontation, and it was the unsettled terms regarding opium legalization in both the Treaty of Nanking and the supplementary Treaty of the Bogue that played a part in paving the way for the Second Opium War. It is immensely important that the peace is designed to be a lasting one, otherwise the only thing it will achieve is putting the bloodshed on pause for maybe ten or twenty years. Therefore, the hypothetical peace proposals discussed- to be framed as alternatives to the actual peace proposals -will not be compromise peace proposals, and while these hypotheticals will ultimately be towards Russia's benefit, this does not mean that they will be entirely to Ukraine's detriment, as Russian success in the field does not yet translate into the vehicle for a punitive peace. There will be certain items Ukraine will be forced to accept and other items that could perhaps become more lenient- furthermore, both the following proposals will be sure to address both Russian national security concerns, as well as Ukraine's needs as a sovereign state.
The first hypothetical will be formed along similar lines to the Russian delegation's peace proposal, including Ukrainian legal recognition of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Crimea, and Zaporizhzhia as part of Russia, Ukrainian permanent neutrality and abstention from joining any military alliance, disbanding of ultranationalist and neo-fascist organizations and political parties, and the enshrined status of the Russian language in Ukraine and fair treatment for the ethnic Russian population. Essentially, the the terms described in the Russian delegation's proposal would remain the same, however with the alteration of provision five, specifically on the maximum size of the AFU, could perhaps be modified to lean more towards a de-escalation of military activity in certain parts of the country- Kiev and Chernigov in particular -along with the addition of allowing Ukraine to join the European Union under a purely economic context, as to not interfere with the provision on Ukrainian neutrality. The second hypothetical proposal, likewise to the first, will base itself off the Russian delegation's proposal, however this proposal will more so concern itself with the Donbas peoples' right to self-determination. This will be achieved through the previously named regions of Ukraine officially annexed into the Russian Federation gaining an official status as something analogous to United Nations Trust Territories- to be either under Russian administration or the administration of a third party. They will persist under this official status for a period of ten years before a referendum is to be held on the future of the regions, either to officially join Russia or to remain with Ukraine. In addition, a demilitarized zone will be established on the border of Russia and Ukraine- drawn in a fashion that will avoid dividing villages in two -that will be managed by the United Nations as a peacekeeping mission under the nationality of a third party country in order to prevent the scenario of a potential flare-up and hostilities resuming- suggestions for this "third party country" include Switzerland, Austria, and Turkey.
In conclusion, while both of these hypothetical proposals will, in all due likelihood, not be what the real peace terms will look like whenever negotiations officially begin, it is said in general confidence that the hypotheticals presented decently accomplish the stated goal of crafting a peace that addresses the main causes of the war in order prevent the need for another war. It additionally avoids the pitfalls inherent in compromise peace while addressing both the concerns of Russia and the sovereignty of Ukraine, which should be an important consideration in the real peace treaty as to avert a revanchist sentiment being able to take root and fester. Both the Treaty of Frankfurt and Treaty of Versailles and their subsequent effect on relations between France and Germany from 1871 to 1939 all but prove that revanchism all but guarantees a new war will occur at some point in the future- be that by a difference of forty years or a difference of twenty. While the falling morale among Ukrainian civilians across the whole country and the growing desire to negotiate an end the war may dampen the effects of revanchist sentiment, that does not mean that it would make it impossible for revanchism to drag the country into a far more destructive war however many decades down the line- perhaps in a similar to France and the "Black Stain" of losing Alsace-Lorraine, or to Germany and her territorial losses as a result of Versailles.
Works Cited
