Research Papers /
The insurgency of the EZLN (IB History Internal Assessment) [3]
Hey! This is my IA for IB Global Studies and I really need some help editing it and cutting out words. I need to cut down about 140 words and I have read it so many times already. These websites shows the guidelines and the recommended word counts for each section:
montgomeryschoolsmd.org/schools/rmhs/departments/socialstudies/IBHistoryIA/sections.htm for
advice, etc.ranchosocialstudies.org/ibamericas/GuidetoIA.htm
for the markbandAny advice on improving the content is wonderful but my main priority is just to get it in the world limit. Thank you so much!! I know it's a lot of reading but I think it's a very interesting subject. Sorry about the random numbers. Those are my footnotes.
How has the insurgency of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) on the Mexican government been a more successful continuation of the Mexican revolution?A Plan of InvestigationThe aim of this investigation is to explain the similarities between the uprisings of the Zapatista Liberation Army of the South in the 1910s and of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Chiapas in 1994, and to discuss why the recent movement is showing more success. The investigation compares the governments of the time as well as the ideologies, goals, and tactics of the two groups. The role of NAFTA and the leadership of Subcomandante Marcos are also considered. In the section "Evaluation of Sources," two sources used for this investigation -"Rebellion in Chiapas," a journal article by Jerry Knudson, and "Imagining the Zapatistas," a journal article by M. Clint McCowan - are evaluated according to their origins, purposes, values, and limitations.
The investigation does not discuss in depth the Constitution of 1917 or the movement for a new constitution following the 1994 rebellion nor does it assess the last years of the Zedillo administration.
B Summary of EvidenceDesigned to protest the effecting of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), made their appearance in the southernmost state of Chiapas on January 1, 1994, capturing San Cristóbal de las Casas and other cities1. This incident was launched into media recognition because of an obscure 12,000 rebel militia's ability to capture the second largest city in the state2. The Mexican administration at the time, referred to as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), was troubled and responded with an army force of 70,000 troops and heavy artillery3. Although the fighting stopped after ten days and the loss of 145 lives4, the conflict was only superficially quelled.
Like the Mexican Revolution, the rebellion in Chiapas was characterized by socialist, liberal, anarchist, and agrarian ideologies. Both times of uprisings were marked by a shift in governmental power. In 1910, it was the end of the Porfiriato (the period of continuous re-election of Porfirio Díaz)5, and in 1994, it was the final year of PRI President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's administration6. Both years had been preceded by a long-standing, one-party rule under which the indigenous population was neglected in order to achieve prosperous foreign relations. By the 20th century, Díaz had established Mexico as an industrialized nation experiencing economic growth for the first time7. Similarly, de Gortari, since his election in 1988, was committed to eliminating protectionist economic policies to propel Mexico into worldwide competition8. In 1994, the passage of NAFTA, "the crowning achievement of the Salinas Administration," gave rise to free trade to augment Mexican corporations and exports to the United States9. In conjunction with NAFTA, Salinas made some troubling changes, such as the privatization of major industries and modifying the Constitution of 1917 to limit certain rights10. One such alteration was Article 27, which had served to protect the ejidos, or communal lands, from seizure11.
In direct response to these changes, the EZLN looked towards their namesake to enact reform. They asserted that Mexico consisted mostly of peasants, impoverished due to the exploitation by the government and the monopolization by large corporations, the same claims made in Zapata's Plan of Ayala12. The EZLN's land reform program included returning the land to those who work it, collective farms to provide for the entire community, and the elimination of debts13. Unlike the Zapatistas of the revolution, the EZLN's intentions were not to take power but to spread an intense spirit of reform. Like Zapata, they demanded, on behalf of all indigenous people, the right to education and dignified jobs, respect for their culture, self-determination, genuinely democratic elections, and the end of poverty. While they drew from Zapata's writings, the EZLN focused more on autonomy, wanted to reform the entire centralist political system, and demanded the elimination of a national government14.
The EZLN was especially noted in the media for its leader, "Subcomandante" Marcos. Although Marcos was born into a middle-class family of businessmen15, he grew up witnessing the unjust dynamic between the peasants and the upper-class, just as Zapata had between the villagers and the sugar hacendados16. Also like Zapata, Marcos began learning about and fighting for this cause early on, presenting radical arguments in opposition to Mexico's capitalist oppression when he was in college17. Marcos led the EZLN with the same spirit of agrarian reform as Zapata in hopes of finally securing justice for Mexico.
C Evaluation of SourcesThe article "Rebellion in Chiapas: insurrection by Internet and public relations" by Jerry Knudson originated from the journal Media, Culture, & Society. Its purpose is to "provide a major international forum for the presentation of research and discussion concerning the media ... within their ... historical context."18 It is valuable because the journal for which it was written specializes in discussing the use of media in history. The author "... is a professor of journalism [and] a former journalist who has specialized in the history of the press in both North America and Latin America." 19 Knudson's specialization in the subject matter makes him a reliable source. Because it was published in 1998, during the height of Zapatistas' popularity, the statements about public opinion were taken in context and are reliable. Moreover, it is said that it "... is based mainly on the results of a computer search of major US newspapers on the Chiapas rebellion between 1994 and 1996."20 The article's statements regarding the EZLN's growing popularity are based on the author's own observance of the Internet as well as outside reports. Thus, Knudson provides primary and secondary sources on which he bases his commentaries. However, the article's notes mention that opposite viewpoints are expressed in a different book that was referred to but not used within the text21. Therefore, one limitation is that Knudson may have refrained from presenting opposing interpretations.
"Imagining the Zapatistas" is an article by M. Clint McCowan published in 2003 in The International Third World Studies Journal and Review, "an annual interdisciplinary journal of scholarship in the field of Third World studies." The journal's purpose is to give scholarly analysis of "economics, politics ... culture, media, education, literature, health issues, and philosophy."22 It aims to "[keep] scholars and researchers informed about important issues concerning developing nations, issues which commonly go unnoticed in other journals."23 Thus, the journal is valuable for offering insight which may not be reported on in other sources. The author specifically researches globalization, political economy, cultural studies, and environmental history24, all of which pertain to the issue of the Zapatista insurgency as a political, social, and cultural revolution. As this is McCowan's second publication in the journal25, he is a reliable contributor to the journal for its specific purposes. McCowan got his research from a large repertoire of sources, including the EZLN's website, books ranging from 1994 to 2001, statements from the EZLN, and interviews with Subcomandante Marcos. By having this variety of primary and secondary sources, the article can incorporate different insights, such as when it discusses whether Subcomandante Marcos is "a mere spokesman for the committee" or "their supreme commander."26 Rather than immediately giving the favorable verdict, McCowan explains the criticisms that have been made on both sides. Furthermore, this article was written almost a decade after the group's emergence and has the advantage of offering a wide perspective and reporting their long-term effects.
D AnalysisThe conflict between the EZLN and the Mexican government is truly a modern Mexican Revolution due to its roots in the still-unresolved issues of land ownership, governance in indigenous communities, peasant rights, and the quality of living for the thousands under the poverty line. The permanence of these issues can be attributed to the similarities of the Díaz and Salinas administrations. Like Díaz, President Salinas focused on attracting foreign investment, allowing Mexico's resources to be liberally exported while domestic production remained neglected27. Both presidents' economic plans improved Mexico's world position but at the expense of the working class. Neither regime had much regard for the rights of the peasants, considering them to be inferior for their poverty and illiteracy28. Díaz would deliberately destroy any opposition just as Salinas eliminated worker safety, meaningful employment, and real wages by setting up NAFTA.
While these issues affected all of Mexico, the rebellion was sited in Chiapas because it represented the worst case. Though one of the leading producers and exporters of various resources, three-quarters of the population were malnourished, had no cash income, lacked any education, and lived in crude housing29. The effects of Salinas's reforms were more drastic there. Many believed that NAFTA would "...only exacerbate the polarization of wealth in Mexico and hence increase the poverty and immiseration of the Mexican poor."30
Furthermore, the government was incompetent at realizing its duty to its inhabitants, resulting in the deterioration of confidence in the PRI. This in turn allowed the EZLN to easily gain support. Like Díaz, the Salinas administration failed to address underlying problems and tried to shove the realities of its crises out of sight so that Mexico could maintain a (false) image of stability to foreign investors31. However, this is where the two movements diverge; unlike the Zapatistas of Diaz's era, the modern uprising has been able to expose these injustices through propaganda with the leadership of Subcomandante Marcos.
By developing a distinct persona evocative of Emiliano Zapata, Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vincente, lovingly known as Subcomandante Marcos, catapulted a group of indigenous farmers to worldwide attention. Marcos became a retrograde revolutionary, an "articulate, photogenic, latter-day Zapata."32 This idealized public perception of him was compounded by his charisma, his erudition, and such physical trademarks as his black ski mask and pipe33. His considerably better education allowed him to enter the scene as a learned and talented writer34. One might consider that Marcos's middle-class background presented a socioeconomic rift between him and his demographic. On the contrary, it is this aspect of the EZLN that has enabled the extent of their success; Marcos's status did not separate him from the indigenous people but rather demonstrated to both them and the government the model of life he wanted to secure.
Moreover, Marcos attracted media attention which has truly been the foundation of the movement's unique success. If not for his tactical approach, the EZLN would have joined the negligible ebb and flow of rebellions in the course of Mexican history. Past uprisings with similar goals have been short-lived because they fought bloody battles while the EZLN has kept their strategy diplomatic35. They have shown that their version of socialism is not rooted in rigid ideology nor does it employ violence, proving their legitimacy. Not only did this rebellion occur when the media could play a decisive role, but Marcos's status as a middle-class intellectual rendered him a difficult target for the government to simply dipose of. The PRI had been able to get away with killing hundreds of dissenters previously because they had been isolated, unnoticed incidents. Media coverage disallowed the government to arbitrarily detain and torture insurgents and still uphold its credibility36. "Marcos had drawn a shield of publicity around himself and the Zapatistas,"37 rendering the government and the military useless against them.
Even in the seizure of San Cristóbal, Marcos refrained from armed confrontation, focusing on attracting attention rather than enacting bloodshed. He kept his intentions clear by creating a website, deemed his communiqués38. The Internet presented advantages in its speed and coverage, its infinite capacity to relay messages, and its inability to be stopped by mere force. A reporter noted, "'With help from peace activists and rebel support groups . . . the Zapatista message is spreading around the world, literally at lightning speed, thanks to telephone links to the Internet computer network.'"39 Marcos embraced any coverage, even in conservative newspapers allowing the Zapatistas to pervade public consciousness beyond Mexico40. Marcos's tact, resourcefulness, and strategy earned the EZLN immense support worldwide, an advantage unable to be had by the Zapatistas of the 1910s.
E ConclusionThe conflict between the Mexican government and the Zapatista insurgents is proof that injustice and turmoil remain extensive in Mexico due to deeply entrenched social, economic, and political instabilities despite the end of the Mexican Revolution and the passage of the Constitution of 1917. However, although the Zapatista rebellion demonstrates the failure of the state to respond to its inhabitants' grievances, it is also a testament to the capacity for change with the passage of time. The EZLN is just one of many insurgent groups in Mexico's history that have risen, fighting for reform. However, because of the evolution of armed fighting to public relations, the EZLN have managed more success in enacting the goals of the legendary Emiliano Zapata - the right to autonomy, cultural recognition, democracy, and a sustainable and dignified lifestyle. It has taken decades of failed rebellions to bring about the success of the EZLN's movement, which is rooted in its exposure of long-standing unjust government practices, its ability to promulgate its cause without appearing overly radical, and its compelling leadership.
F List of Sources"An Anarchist View of the EZLN." Red and Black Revolution. Oct. 1994.
Dent, David W. Encyclopedia of Modern Mexico. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2002.
Hamnett, Brian R. A Concise History of Mexico. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Kirkwood, Burton. The History of Mexico. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000.
Knudson, Jerry W. "Rebellion in Chiapas: insurrection by Internet and public relations." Media, Culture, & Society Version 20 (1998): 507-18.
McCowan, M. Clint. "Imagining the Zapatistas: Rebellion, Representation, and Popular Culture." International Third World Studies Journal and Review Version XIV (2003): 29-33. Web.
Meyer, Michael C., William L. Sherman, and Susan M. Deeds. The Course of Mexican History. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Pearce, Kenneth. A Traveller's History of Mexico. Brooklyn: Interlink Books, 2002.
Proyect, Louis. "Understanding Chiapas." Pierre J. Proudhon Memorial Computer.
Shorris, Earl. The Life and Times of Mexico. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004.
Suchlicki, Jaime. Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA, Chiapas, and Beyond. Washington: Brassey's, Inc., 1996.
Wehling, Jason. "Zapatismo: What the EZLN is Fighting For." The Portland State University Sentinel 10 Jan. 1995.
